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Executive summary
Under the current European Union frameworks for dealing with banking problems, 
resolution of banks is seen as an exception to be activated only if liquidation under national 
insolvency proceedings would not be warranted. This is most notably the case when the bank 
provides critical functions to the economy, or when its liquidation might threaten financial 
stability.
The two options – resolution and liquidation – differ substantially when it comes to 
the scope of legislation that is applicable to the use of public funds. The EU Bank Recovery 
and Resolution Directive (2014/59/EU) covers resolution, while liquidation is regulated by 
national insolvency laws. The liquidations of Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza 
in Italy highlight how this two-tier framework raises important questions in the context of EU 
banking union. 
The first question is whether the definitions of critical functions and public interest – key 
elements in the context of liquidation – should be clarified. A second question is whether the 
current legal and regulatory situation within banking union ensures that similar banks can 
expect predictable equal treatment in case of failure.
We argue that there should be more clarity over the role that the concepts of critical 
functions and public interest play in Member States’ decision to grant liquidation aid, as the 
current framework might give rise to situations in which the views of national authorities 
seem to contradict the Single Resolution Board’s assessment.
While the purpose of this Policy Contribution is not to provide a comprehensive over-
view of different national insolvency regimes, we argue that the current diversity is a source 
of uncertainty about the outcome of liquidation procedures, for all participants. For banking 
union to function effectively, the framework should be changed to provide the same level of 
certainty in liquidation as there is expected to be in resolution.
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1 Introduction
On 27 January 2017, Single Resolution Board (SRB) chair Elke König said1 “[m]ost banks are 
now in such a shape that […] their failure would not endanger financial stability and that they 
can be resolved if they fail – like any other business in the market economy – through regular 
insolvency procedures. [...] The extra safety net of resolution is only for the few”. Under the cur-
rent European Union frameworks for dealing with banking problems, resolution is seen as an 
exception to be allowed only if liquidation under national insolvency proceedings would not 
be warranted. This is the case when the bank provides critical functions to the economy, or 
when its liquidation might threaten financial stability. In such instances, the Single Resolu-
tion Board (SRB) is expected to establish the existence of a public interest, for the bank to be 
put into resolution.
The two options – resolution and liquidation – differ substantially when it comes to the 
legislation that is applicable to the use of public funds. The EU Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive (BRRD, 2014/59/EU) governs resolution, while liquidation is regulated by national 
insolvency laws. The use of public funds in resolution is subject to both state aid rules and 
the BRRD – thus requiring a preliminary bail-in up to at least 8 percent of total liabilities – but 
the use of public funds in liquidation is only subject to the state aid requirement that there 
be a ‘light’ burden-sharing of equity and junior debt. Depending on the structure of individ-
ual banks’ balance sheets – ie on how much junior debt they have on their liability side – the 
BRRD bail-in requirement could potentially reach up to senior bondholders, whereas the 
light state aid burden allows them to be shielded from losses. 
We look at the liquidations of Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza and highlight 
how this two-tier framework raises important questions in the context of banking union, the 
ultimate aim of which is to ensure clarity about the rules governing banking crises and their 
outcomes for banks, private creditors and taxpayers. The first question is whether the defini-
tions of critical functions and of public interest – two key elements in the context of liquidation 
– should be clarified. While we think these concepts are clear for the purpose of the SRB’s 
assessment, more clarity is warranted in terms of their application in the context of member 
states’ decisions to grant liquidation aid. 
A second question is whether the current legal and regulatory environment within 
banking union ensures that similar banks can expect predictable equal treatment in case of 
failure. While the purpose of this paper is not to provide a comprehensive overview of differ-
ent national insolvency regimes across the EU – work that others have done2 – we argue that 
the current diversity in national insolvency frameworks is a source of uncertainty about the 
outcomes of liquidation procedures, for all participants. The fact that insolvency law remains 
national allows member states to amend it compared to the normal insolvency proceedings 
that constitute the reference for the SRB’s assessment of the no-creditor-worse-off condition. 
In particular, to the extent that different governments have different propensities to provide 
liquidation aid to the banking sector, the final outcome is unclear. Without an EU insolvency 
law – or at least further harmonisation – this can lead to paradoxical results, such as in the 
Italian case where senior creditors were eventually better off under insolvency than they 
would have been under resolution, while taxpayers were worse off. For banking union to 
function effectively, the framework should be clarified to provide the same level of certainty 
over liquidation as there is expected to be over resolution.
1   In a speech to the Belgian Financial Forum, January 2017.
2   For example, McCormack et al (2016).
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2 The Veneto and Vicenza cases
On 23 June 2017, Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza– were declared to be “failing 
or likely to fail” by the European Central Bank (ECB) in its capacity as supervisor for euro-area 
significant institutions3. The two banks had already been among the Italian institutions that 
failed the ECB’s comprehensive assessment in 2014. In 2016, they benefitted from €3.5 billion 
in investment from the Italian bank-funded Atlante fund, but their financial positions deteri-
orated further in 2017 (Merler, 2017a), ultimately resulting in a combined capital need of €1.2 
billion. In March 2017, the two banks requested precautionary recapitalisations, which how-
ever would have required the capital shortfall to be covered by private means as a pre-condi-
tion (Merler, 2017b). The ECB eventually deemed the banks’ business plans not credible. This 
negative assessment opened up the possibility of either resolution or liquidation, with the 
decision referred to the Single Resolution Board (SRB). The SRB decided that public interest 
in resolution was not present, because neither of the banks provided critical functions and 
their failure was unlikely to have a significant adverse impact on financial stability.  
Table 1: Assets and liabilities acquired by Intesa (ISP)
Assets € bns Liabilities € bns
Credits vis-à-vis banks 3.8 Debts vis-à-vis banks 9.3
Credits vis-à-vis customers 30.1 Debts vis-à-vis customers 25.8
Financial Assets 8.8 Bonds (ISP only takes senior) 11.8
Shareholdings 0.02 Financial liabilities 2.6
Others 3.01 Others 1.8
Total 
(incl. imbalance and financing 
to LCA)
51.3 Total 51.3
Source: Bank of Italy (2017).
As a result, Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza were wound down under Italian 
insolvency law on 25 June 2017. Italian law provides for several insolvency procedures: banks 
and other financial institutions – and other selected types of enterprises – are subject to 
“forced administrative liquidation” (Liquidazione Coatta Amministrativa (Baker McKenzie, 
2017); see Box 1 in section 4.2 for details). In the context of liquidation, shares (mostly owned 
by Atlante) and subordinated debt were wiped out to meet the minimum burden-sharing 
requirement established in the European Commission’s 2013 Communication on State Aid 
to Banks. The performing parts of the banks’ assets were acquired by Intesa San Paolo – Italy’s 
second largest bank – together with some of the liabilities, most notably deposits and senior 
debt (see Table 1 for details). Intesa paid a symbolic sum of €1 for the acquisition, and benefit-
ted from a €4.8 billion cash injection by the state. Of this, €3.5 billion was intended to ensure 
that the acquisition would not undermine Intesa’s equity ratios, while €1.3 billion was des-
tined to cover the costs of closing branches and managing dismissal/redeployment of the staff 
of the banks being liquidated. Intesa was also granted state guarantees that could potentially 
total up to €12 billion4. Of this, up to €6.35 billion might cover the repayment of debt held that 
was deemed to be not good after due diligence; up to €4 billion might constitute a buffer for 
currently performing debts that are high risk; and the remaining guarantee of up to €2 billion 
might cover potential legal risks of the banks being liquidated. The non-performing parts of 
the two banks’ balance sheets were transferred to SGA (Società per la Gestione di Attività) – a 
3   ECB press release: https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2017/html/ssm.pr170623.en.html. 
4   Italian law decree No 99 of 25 June 2017.
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vehicle set up for the rescue of Banco di Napoli at the end of the 1990s – with aim of maximis-
ing the recovery over time. 
The cases of Veneto Banca and Popolare di Vicenza are reminiscent of that of Banca 
Romagna Cooperativa (BRC), a significantly smaller5 Italian lender liquidated in July 2015 
(Merler, 2016). BRC’s assets and liabilities were transferred to Banca Sviluppo, part of the 
Italian ICCREA Group. In the process, BRC equity and junior debt remained in the liquida-
tion estate – similarly to what happened in the Veneto and Vicenza cases. The BRC operation 
was conducted under national insolvency law by selling only parts of assets and liabilities 
out of liquidation. The Italian mandatory deposit guarantee scheme for the sector (FGDCC) 
covered the negative difference between the transferred assets and liabilities – an action that 
qualified as state aid, because it was beyond the DGS’ pay-out function. This was authorised 
by the European Commission. The scale of the BRC case was obviously much smaller than 
the Veneto and Vicenza cases, and the cost of the operation for the Mutual Bank Deposit 
Guarantee Fund (FGDCC) was estimated at the time as €260.8 million maximum (European 
Commission, 2015). 
Because of the structure of the operation, the Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di 
Vicenza cases have also been compared to the case of the Spanish Banco Popular, which 
was acquired for a symbolic amount of €1 by Banco Santander. In contrast to the two Italian 
banks, however, Banco Popular was put in resolution by the SRB for public interest reasons. 
The similarity between the Italian and Spanish cases stems from the fact that the sale and 
transfer of part of the failing banks’ balance sheets to a buyer is also foreseen as a resolution 
tool under Article 38 BRRD. Mesnard et al (2017) highlights also that the measures imple-
mented in the Italian case are very similar to those in previous resolution cases implemented 
in the EU, such as the resolution of the Greek Panellinia Bank through a transfer order to 
Piraeus Bank in April 20156. Despite superficial similarities, however, there are significant 
differences between the Italian and Spanish operations when it comes to the applicability of 
EU legislation in terms of use of public funds. Section 3 reviews this in more detail.
3 Liquidation vs. resolution
3.1 Conditions 
The current EU rules give two options for dealing with banks that declared by the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism to be failing or likely to fail: liquidation or resolution. The decision 
on which approach should be followed in each case is a prerogative of the Single Resolution 
Board (SRB), and it hinges on an assessment of the existence of public interest. Because of its 
potential effects on property rights, the choice to put a bank into resolution should be seen 
as an exception (European Commission, 2017), limited to cases in which winding up the 
institution under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet the resolution objectives 
to the same extent7. Resolution aims at ensuring continuity of critical functions, avoiding a 
significant adverse effect on the financial system, protecting public funds, covered depositors 
and covered investors, and clients’ assets and funds8. If the SRB decides that resolution is not 
in the public interest, then the bank is wound down under national insolvency law.
5   As of 31 May 2015, the unpublished accounts of BRC show a balance sheet size of €891 million and a loss of €111.3 
million (see European Commission, 2015).
6   In that case, the performing part of the balance sheet was transferred to another Greek bank, and the difference 
between assets and liabilities was financed by the Greek resolution fund.
7   Art. 32 BRRD.
8   Art. 31(2) BRRD.
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3.2 Use of public funds 
One important point to note is that the two options differ quite significantly when it comes to 
the scope of EU legislation applicable to the use of public funds (Figure 1). 
Article 32(4) of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) suggests that, as a 
rule, the fact that a banks needs public support is sufficient for the ECB to declare the bank 
failing or likely to fail. Banks that happen to have capital shortfalls should therefore ideally 
cover that from private sources. If that is not feasible, a member state can still intervene in line 
with market conditions, ie on terms that would be the same for a private investor. This kind of 
intervention would remain outside the scope of both the resolution framework and EU state 
aid policy9.  Alternatively, if the bank is solvent it could qualify for precautionary recapitalisa-
tion, which allows the use of public funds in compliance with state-aid rules and outside the 
scope of the BRRD resolution framework. Article 32(4.d) BRRD states that this extraordinary 
public financial support does not trigger resolution if it is required “in order to remedy a seri-
ous disturbance in the economy of a member state and preserve financial stability”, and if it is 
“at prices and on terms that do not confer an advantage upon the institution.” If the conditions 
for precautionary recapitalisation are met, public funds can thus be used without triggering 
resolution and the associated 8 percent bail-in requirement. The burden-sharing requirement 
of equity and junior debt would still apply, as per the Commission’s 2013 State Aid Communi-
cation10.
Figure 1: Use of public funds in the EU framework
Source:  European Commission (2017).
9   An example is the recapitalisation of Portuguese Caixa Geral de Depósitos in March 2017. See European 
Commission (2017).
10  This option was used in Italy with Monte Dei Paschi in June 2017.
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If a bank is declared by the ECB to be failing or likely to fail11, the precautionary recapitali-
sation option is not available, and the choice is between liquidation or resolution. If the bank 
is put into resolution, the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation (SRMR) requires that the 
bank’s losses be covered by the bail-in of shareholders and creditors up to 8 percent of the 
bank’s liabilities, before the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) can be accessed. Depending on 
the composition of individual banks’ balance sheets, this may imply the bail-in of senior debt 
and potentially even uncovered deposits. The use of funds from the SRF is anyway subject to 
the Commission’s State aid assessment. State aid is possible in the context of liquidation – in 
the form of liquidation aid – and it is subject to the State aid discipline, including the bur-
den-sharing requirements laid out in the 2013 Communication. The rationale underlying aid 
in liquidation is that while the winding up of small banks is not expected to have systemic 
effects, it may still have important local effects. Currently, it is for Member States to decide 
whether liquidation may harm the local economy, and whether the use national funds is 
warranted to mitigate the damage – although liquidation aid would then need to be cleared 
by the Commission.
A comparison of the Banco Popular case with the Veneto and Vicenza cases highlights 
the practical implications of this different legal scope. The use of public funds in the context 
of resolution with sale of assets to a private investor would have required the preliminary 
bail-in of at least 8 percent of the banks’ equity and liabilities. Depending on the structure 
of the bank’s balance sheet, this preliminary requirement could have entailed a bail-in of 
senior liabilities. The use of public funds in the context of a similar operation conducted in 
liquidation is instead regulated under the State aid framework, which requires a preliminary 
contribution of equity and junior debt only. In both the case of Popular and the case of the 
two Italian banks, senior debt was not touched. But Banco Popular was resolved under BRRD, 
and the sale of business was accompanied by a €7 billion capital raise from the acquiring 
bank (Santander) and a €3.3 billion bail-in of equity and debt. In the case of two Italian banks, 
which were dealt with under national insolvency law, equity and junior debt were wiped out 
but the acquiring bank (Intesa) benefitted from publicly financed liquidation aid. 
4 Question raised
Since the scope of EU law regulating the use of public money in resolution and liquidation is 
different, a substantially similar operation conducted under these two different frameworks 
can lead to very different outcomes for (i) the acquiring bank; (ii) the banks’ creditors; and 
(iii) the taxpayers. The distinction between resolution and liquidation is ultimately based on 
the existence of public interest, an assessment that is the task of the SRB. In this section we 
look at the SRB’s assessments in the cases of Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza, 
and at the implications national insolvency frameworks might have on the clarity of EU rules 
in the context of banking union. 
4.1 Critical functions and public interest
A closer look at the cases of Veneto Banca and Popolare di Vicenza reveals a friction in terms of 
the presence of a public interest as viewed by the SRB and as viewed by the Italian government. 
A key element in the assessment of whether there is a public interest is the criticality 
of specific functions performed by the banks that are failing or likely to fail. Commission 
Regulation 2016/778 defines a function as critical when: (i) it is “provided by an institution 
to third parties not affiliated to the institution or group”; and (ii) “a sudden disruption of that 
11  Art. 32(4) BRRD.
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function would likely have a material negative impact on third parties, give rise to contagion or 
undermine the general confidence of market participants because of the systemic relevance of 
the function for third parties and the systemic relevance of the institution or group in providing 
the function”. 
The SRB decision, published on 23 June 2017, states that a public interest was not present 
in the cases of Veneto Banca and Popolare di Vicenza, because neither bank provides critical 
functions, and their failure would not be expected to have a significant adverse impact on 
financial stability. With respect to the functions identified by the institutions as critical – ie 
deposit taking, lending activities and payment services – the SRB concluded that these are 
provided to a limited number of third parties and can be replaced in an acceptable manner 
and within a reasonable timeframe. 
The assessment of the financial stability implications largely looks at the extent of 
the two banks’ systemic relevance and interconnectedness. A previous SRB assessment 
– based on information available at the end of 2015 – deemed liquidation under normal 
insolvency procedure not credible, mostly because of the potential adverse impact on 
market confidence and the risk of contagion spreading to other credit institutions12. For 
both banks, the SRB’s assessment changed in light of significant developments during 
2016, which reduced the banks’ systemic relevance13. In particular, the SRB highlighted 
that despite significant deposit outflows since the beginning of 2016, deposit volumes 
in Italy remained relatively stable, suggesting that the two banks’ deposit outflows were 
absorbed by other institutions in Italy. This is taken by the SRB also as evidence support-
ing the view that the deposit-taking function of the two banks was not critical, because it 
could be replaced within a reasonable timeframe by some of the active credit institutions 
in the regions concerned, limiting the potential damage to the real economy and the 
financial markets. 
In looking at the effect of liquidation on financial stability, the SRB focused on Italy as a 
whole, but also stressed that:
“despite higher market shares at the regional level, it has to be noted that the market 
share of the Banks, even in the core region of Veneto, has deteriorated without 
having a measurable impact as evidenced by key economic indicators. Furthermore, 
substitutability of the deposit and lending functions in the Veneto region is expected 
to be high due to the large number of credit institutions active in the region.” 
[author’s emphasis]
In its assessment, the SRB thus excluded the notion that liquidation would have a systemic 
impact at national level, and also seemed to dismiss the possibility of a significant impact at 
the local level. The Italian Government’s Decree, published on 25 June and converted into law 
in July 2017, takes an opposite view. The introductory recitals in the Italian Decree (Italian 
Parliament, 2017) state that:
“Without measures of public support, the placement of [the two banks] into a forced 
administrative liquidation would lead to the destruction of value of the banks, with 
consequent serious losses for non-professional creditors that are not protected nor 
preferred, and it would entail a sudden interruption in the provision of credit to busi-
nesses and families with negative repercussions of economic and social character, as 
well as on employment”. [author’s translation]
12  SRB (2017a), recital (19) page 5; SRB (2017c), recital (19) page 5.
13  SRB(2017a), recital (50), page 8.
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[Consequently,] “there is the extraordinary need and urgency to adopt measures aimed 
at allowing the orderly exit of the banks from the market and avoiding a serious distur-
bance to the local economy” 
The view of the Italian government is reiterated in MEF (2017) where, in discussing the 
state aid measures implemented, the €3.5 billion support to Banca Intesa is described as “fun-
damental because it is precisely this intervention that guarantees the continuity of provision of 
credit to the present customers of the two banks (families, businesses, artisans)”. But this seems 
to contradict the SRB’s conclusion about the substitutability – even at the local level – of the 
banks’ functions. Ultimately, the justification for the state aid provided in the Italian case 
hinges on the government’s own assessment of local effects of liquidation. The wording of 
the decree seems to contradict the SRB’s own view about the banks’ critical functions: while 
the SRB identified no public interest that would justify resolution, the national government 
identified enough public interest to justify sizable state aid.
A first question raised by the Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza cases is thus 
whether the definition of critical functions and the applicable assessment criteria are suffi-
ciently clear at EU level. Here a distinction is worth making. While the definition of critical 
functions seems to be clear insofar as it concerns the SRB’s assessment of the existence of 
public interest, it is not equally clear what role it plays in the EU discipline on liquidation aid, 
which is mostly contained in the Commission’s 2013 Communication. The rationale for allow-
ing Member States to provide liquidation aid is laid out in European Commission (2017), 
according to which: “outside the European banking resolution framework, it is for Member 
States to decide whether they consider a bank exit to have a serious impact on the regional 
economy, e.g. on the financing of small and medium enterprises in the regional economy, and 
whether they wish to use national funds to mitigate these effects”. The 2013 Communication, 
however, does not include guidelines or on how this decision should be taken. In the absence 
of clarity on what constitutes a reasonable “serious impact on the regional economy” the rules 
on liquidation aid leave room for potentially controversial results. This in turn raises the ques-
tion of whether the SRB itself should be tasked with providing an explicit assessment of the 
impact of liquidation at the local level. This would have an obvious benefit in terms of clarity 
of the assessments underlying decisions to grant liquidation aid, but it would be best comple-
mented by a harmonisation of insolvency frameworks, which currently differ significantly at 
the national level (see next section).
4.2 What are normal insolvency proceedings?
In the BRRD and the SRMR, normal insolvency proceedings14 are the benchmark scenario 
against which the (exceptional) alternative of resolution is assessed. Article 74 of the BRRD 
and Article 15(1) of the SRMR state that “no creditor shall incur greater loss than would have 
been incurred if the entity had been wound up (...) under normal insolvency proceedings” (no 
creditor worse off principle). Article 20(16) and 20(17) SRMR provide for a valuation to be 
conducted to assess whether the treatment of shareholders and creditors under normal insol-
vency proceedings would differ from that under resolution. Importantly, Article 20(18) of the 
SRMR states that the valuation of the insolvency proceedings scenario should disregard any 
extraordinary public financial support.  
Unlike resolution, however, insolvency remains regulated at national level by national 
insolvency laws. This creates two potential problems. First, the insolvency regimes of different 
countries differ (see McCormack et al, 2014, for a detailed legal perspective). As mentioned 
in section 3, Italian law provides for several insolvency procedures, where banks and other 
14  Article 2(47) of BRRD states that: “‘normal insolvency proceedings’ means collective insolvency proceedings which 
entail the partial or total divestment of a debtor and the appointment of a liquidator or an administrator normally 
applicable to institutions under national law and either specific to those institutions or generally applicable to any 
natural or legal person”.
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financial institutions – as well as other selected types of enterprises –  are subject to a regime 
called “forced administrative liquidation” (Liquidazione Coatta Amministrativa, LCA). Under 
the LCA framework, liquidators are nominated by the Bank of Italy, which enjoys a high 
degree of oversight over the process. Unlike other procedures – and unlike what happens in 
other countries such as Spain – there is no delegated judge, and the LCA is mainly admin-
istrative in nature (Baker McKenzie, 2017; see Box 1 for details). This probably reflects the 
intention to ensure a swift liquidation for entities that are perceived as critical, taking them 
out of the traditionally long Italian judicial procedure. The Italian Parliament voted on 11 
October 2017 on a new law that will streamline insolvency and bankruptcy in Italy. Among 
other changes, the new law reduces the scope of the LCA, but does not change its applicabil-
ity to banks and financial institutions15.
BOX 1: Liquidation in Italy and in Spain
In Italy, liquidazione coatta amministrativa (LCA) is the ordinary liquidation proceeding 
for banks and financial institutions, governed by Legislative Decree no. 385/1993 (the Italian 
Banking Act) and by specific provisions of the Italian Transposing Law and of the Italian 
statute governing insolvencies, Royal Decree no. 267/1942. LCA is initiated by issuance of a 
decree by the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance, and the first step is the appointment 
by the Bank of Italy of one or more receivers and a supervisory committee to monitor the liq-
uidation process. The receivers replace the former management, ascertain the institution’s 
liabilities, carry out the liquidation of assets, take any legal action in respect of the possible 
liabilities of the former management and auditors and periodically report to the Bank of 
Italy. Following the issuance of the decree and the appointment of the receivers, no acts 
of enforcement may be initiated or continued by creditors, and all payments due from the 
financial institution are suspended. Within 30 days of the receivers’ appointment, all credi-
tors are formally notified of their claims; the statement of liabilities, consisting of a list of the 
creditors admitted to the LCA proceedings, is then filed by the receivers with Bank of Italy. 
The statement also identifies the creditors’ ranking and the size of their claims. Transfers can 
be performed at any stage of LCA, including prior to the filing of the definitive statement of 
liabilities. The receivers may carry out the liquidation either by selling individual assets or 
through sale of aggregates of assets and liabilities. 
In Spain, insolvency law establishes one single insolvency procedure (concurso), ap-
plied to any insolvent debtor, which includes a common phase during which the insolvency 
administrator is appointed, an inventory of the assets and creditors is performed, and claims 
are ranked. The insolvency process is supervised by the Spanish Mercantile Courts, which are 
competent to hear and decide on insolvency proceedings of a credit institution. Differently 
from the Bank of Italy – which appoints the liquidators – the Fund for Orderly Bank Restruc-
turing (FROB)’s role in normal insolvency procedure is limited to presenting the Court with 
a proposed list of insolvency administrators from which the Court must select the appointee. 
The treatment and safeguards provided to the various classes of creditors and the ranking of 
their claims in insolvency proceedings of Spanish credit institutions are the same established 
by the law for creditors or claims relating to any non-banking business subject to insolvency 
proceedings. The Spanish transposition of the BRRD, however, provides exceptions in the 
event of an insolvency proceeding of a Spanish credit institution. 
Source: SRB (2017a; 2017b).
15  DDL n. 2681.
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A second issue related to the national character of insolvency frameworks is the potential for 
them to be altered under national law. In its assessments published on 23 June 201716, the 
SRB stated that in order to assess the need to take resolution action based on the resolution 
objectives of protecting depositors and investors and protecting client assets and client funds, 
a comparison was made between the hypothetical resolution action and LCA proceedings. 
The SRB specifically states that:
since “normal insolvency proceedings (ie LCA) allow for the transfer to a purchaser of 
the same portfolio which could have been transferred in case of resolution action, it can 
be concluded that LCA proceedings could meet these two resolution objectives to the 
same extent”17. 
The SRB also observes that18:
“Normal Italian insolvency proceedings would achieve the resolution objectives to the 
same extent as resolution, since such proceedings would also ensure a comparable degree 
of protection for depositors, investors, other customers, clients’ funds and assets.”
So, in the context of the SRB’s assessment, “winding-up of the institution under normal 
insolvency proceedings” refers for the SRB to the LCA proceedings19, and when discussing the 
Italian LCA and its degree of creditor protections, the SRB makes no mention of additional 
public funds20. 
However, the opening recitals of the request to convert into law the Italian Decree of 25 
June 201721 state that:“[…] the banks must be put into LCA as provided […for by] the 
[Italian] Banking Law [Testo Unico Bancario]. However, the ordinary liquidation proce-
dure in atomistic form would imply very serious damages to the economy: it is therefore 
appropriate to envisage a solution that allows managing the crisis of the two groups 
with additional instruments with respect to those foreseen in the Banking Law” [author’s 
translation ]
This wording suggests that the regime actually implemented was a modified version of the 
ordinary liquidation proceedings, by the addition of liquidation aid. The recital of the actual 
Decree text offers a similar view when pointing out that:
“Without measures of public support, the placement of [the two banks] into a forced 
administrative liquidation would lead to the destruction of value of the banks, with 
consequent serious losses for non-professional creditors that are not protected nor pre-
ferred, and it would entail a sudden interruption in the provision of credit to businesses 
and families with negative repercussions of economic and social character, as well as on 
employment”. [author’s translation]
The effect of this has been that senior creditors were actually better off in insolvency than 
they would have been in a resolution. The peculiarity of this outcome was noticed – among 
16  SRB (2017a) and SRB (2017c)
17  SRB (2017a; 2017c), recital (51), page 9.
18  SRB (2017d); see also SRB(2017a; 2017c).
19  SRB (2017a; 2017c) Article 4(1).
20  SRB (2017a; 2017c), Section 2.2.1 (‘Description of the Italian insolvency proceedings’).
21  See Mesnard et al (2017): http://www.camera.it/leg17/995?sezione=documenti&tipoDoc=lavori_testo_pdl&idLeg-
islatura=17&codice=17PDL0053070&back_to=http://www.camera.it/leg17/126?tab=2-e-leg=17-e-idDocumen-
to=4565-e-sede=-e-tipo=#RL. 
11 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚01 | January 2018
others – by the chairman of the European Banking Authority Andrea Enria who stressed that 
creditors in liquidation should not be better off than in resolution22. The fact that insolvency 
law remains a national prerogative, coupled with the abovementioned lack of clarity in EU 
legislation about liquidation aid, creates uncertainty about the extent of possible amend-
ments by national governments with different propensities to use public funds, and the 
ensuing consequences for the banks, their private creditors and taxpayers. To ensure that 
banks failing in different countries are liquidated under the same conditions and thus know 
what to expect, national insolvency laws should be harmonised, preferably by introducing an 
EU insolvency framework. 
5 Conclusions
Under the current EU frameworks for dealing with banks that are failing or likely to fail, reso-
lution is seen as an exception to be granted only in case liquidation under national insolvency 
proceedings would not be feasible or warranted. This is part of a more general shift towards 
less involvement of public funds in managing banking crises. But resolution and liquidation 
differ substantially when it comes to the scope of legislation that is applicable to the use of 
public funds. While resolution is governed by the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
(BRRD), liquidation is regulated by national insolvency laws. While the use of public funds in 
resolution would be subject to both BRRD and state aid rules – thus requiring a preliminary 
bail-in up to at least 8 percent of total liabilities – the use of public funds in liquidation is only 
subject to state aid burden-sharing requirements. 
Ultimately, the distinction between liquidation and resolution relies on the SRB’s assess-
ment of whether there is public interest, which in turn hinges on a determination of whether 
the functions performed by the failing institution are critical. In this paper, we have looked 
at the practical application of the SRMR’s requirements in the liquidation of the two Italian 
banks, Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca, highlighting the existence of two prob-
lematic issues. 
First, while the definition of critical functions seems clear as regards the SRB’s assessment 
of the existence of a public interest, it is not equally clear what role it plays in the EU disci-
pline on liquidation aid, as the 2013 Banking Communication does not include guidelines or 
on how the local effect of liquidation should be evaluated. In the absence of clarity on what 
constitutes a serious impact on the regional economy, the rules on liquidation aid leave room 
for governments to effectively re-instate at the local level the public interest that the SRB has 
denied at national (or, in the Italian case, even at the regional) level. One way to overcome 
this problem could be to task the SRB with providing an explicit assessment of the impact of 
liquidation at the local level, to ensure the assessment is homogeneous. 
The second, related, issue is that the Veneto and Vicenza cases highlight the problematic 
nature of a two-tier framework in which resolution is dealt with under EU law and liquidation 
is left for diverse national insolvency procedures. The problem with this is twofold. On one 
hand, the difference in insolvency frameworks implies that failing banks would face differ-
ent insolvency proceedings in different countries. For example, in Spain, banks would face a 
court-based process, while the Italian special regime for banks is essentially administrative. 
The fact that insolvency is regulated under national law also makes it easier for governments 
to amend the ordinary insolvency framework. This could give rise to peculiar situations 
whereby senior creditors fare better in insolvency than they would in resolution, such as in 
22  La Stampa, ‘Enria (Eba): “We warned Italy in 2014 about risks for banks”’, available at http://www.lastampa.
it/2017/07/19/esteri/lastampa-in-english/enria-eba-we-warned-italy-in-about-risks-for-banks-ZqtCBNa7Yp1d-
PEtxY5CHWI/pagina.html. 
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the cases of Veneto and Vicenza. In order to avoid this uncertainty, the best option would be 
to further harmonise insolvency laws, possibly introducing an EU-wide regime. 
For banking union to function properly, banks, creditors and taxpayers deserve to have 
certainty about the rules governing liquidation. This objective would best be served by a 
single EU insolvency regime to complement the current EU framework for resolution, and 
by a clarification of the extent to which Member States have discretion to establish the local 
public interest when it comes to liquidation aid.
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